Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enables mutually untrusting parties to perform a
shared computation without revealing any information about their input that is
not already leaked by the result of the computation.
Depending on the network and adversary model, i.e. how parties communicate and
what capabilities an attacker possesses, different notions are achievable or
impossible. Early works show that when a majority or parties is corrupt, then
output cannot be guaranteed, and indeed not even fairness
[Cle86].
To sidestep this fundamental impossibility,
Identifiable Abort has been
introduced
[IOZ14]: here an adversary may abort the protocol but it must reveal
the identity of at least one corrupted party.
Recently, given a broadcast,
[Bra21] has shown that relatively small setups suffice for n-party MPC using the graph-theoretical technique of
[BMM+20].
The goal of this thesis is to extend the technique of
[BMM+20] to protocols
without broadcast to achieve analogous bounds for the minimal size as
[Bra21].
Another possible topic is to improve or show the impossibility of improving the scaling behavior of the protocols in
[Bra21] to support a larger number of overall parties.
Contact: Nicholas Brandt
Keywords: Combinatorics, Graph Theory,
Universal Composability